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Work For Hire After CCNV v. REID:1
Adequacy of Protection for Artists and
Extent of the Doctrine's Applicability to

Software Developers
I.

INTRODUCTION

Article I, section 8, clause 8 of the United States Constitution

authorizes Congress to legislate for copyright protection: "The Con-

gress shall have Power . . . To promote the Progress of Science and

useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors
the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries .... "1
General terminology was used in defining Congress' power to provide
copyright protection for scientific and artistic works as a result of the
drafters' recognition that it would be difficult to predict the future
forms of science and art.'

The Copyright Act of 1909 (1909 Act)4 and the Copyright Act of
1976 (1976 Act)5 were promulgated pursuant to the authority granted
by the Constitution. 6 The 1976 Act preempts state law in favor of a
federal copyright system 7 because the flow of commerce is not limited
by state boundaries. A uniform federal copyright system is therefore
necessary to protect individual grants of copyright. 8 A copyright may
1. Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 109 S. Ct. 2166 (1989).
2. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8.
3. See Comment, Joint Ownership of Computer Software Copyright: A
Solution To The Work For Hire Dilemma, 137 U. PA. L. REv. 1251, 1255 (1989)
[hereinafter Comment, Work For Hire Dilemma].
4. The Copyright Act of 1909, Pub. L. No. 60-349, ch. 320, § 62, 35 Stat.
1075, 1088, repealed by The Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, §§ 101810, 90 Stat. 2541, 2544 (codified at 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1982)) [hereinafter 1909 Act].
5. The Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, §§ 101-810, 90 Stat. 2541,
2544 (codified at 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1982)) [hereinafter 1976 Act].
6. See supra text accompanying notes 2-3.
7. 17 U.S.C. § 301 (1982) provides, "[A]II legal or equitable rights that are
equivalent to any of the exclusive rights within the general scope of copyright ...
and come within the subject matter of copyright ... are governed exclusively by this
title ....
[N]o person is entitled to any such right or equivalent right in any such
work under the common law or statutes of any state."
8. Without a federal system of copyright, two or more states could grant
copyrights to different authors in the same work, one of which was directly copied
from the other. As a result, the true author is deprived of greater exploitation of her
work (monetary and otherwise) as well as incentive to produce the work, which
defeats the Constitutional purpose for authorizing such protection.
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be obtained for "original works of authorship fixed in any tangible
medium of expression." 9 Protection is afforded to original expressions
of ideas but is explicitly withheld from ideas themselves, 0 because
ideas must remain in the public domain for the benefit of and use by
all people."I The primary benefit of a grant of copyright is the exclusive
right of the author to reproduce the work and to prepare derivative
works based upon the copyrighted work. 2 Grants of copyright are
intended to promote the progress of science and art while disseminating the works for the public benefit and welfare by providing protection and thereby incentive to create to the authors of works. 3
Both the 1909 Act and the 1976 Act contain work for hire
clauses 4 which provide limitations to the protection afforded artists
9. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1982).
10. 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1982) ("In no case does copyright protection for an
original work of authorship extend to any idea, procedure, process, system, method
of operation, concept, principle, or discovery, regardless of the form in which it is
described, explained, illustrated, or embodied in such work." This is often referred
to as the "idea/expression dichotomy."). See also Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99
(1879) (landmark decision that copyright protection extends only to the expression
and not to the idea behind the expression).
11. Copyright is one form of protection for intellectual property and grants
the copyright holder the exclusive right to reproduce the work. Other forms include
patent, which provides the holder with the exclusive right to the idea for a limited
time, and trademark, which provides the holder with the exclusive right to use a
particular mark to identify and distinguish its goods in commerce. See GOLDSTEIN,
COPYRIGHT, PATENT, TRADEMARK AND RELATED STATE DOCTRINES 9-10, 15, 19 (1981).
12. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1982). A goal of copyright is to stimulate and encourage
creation of scientific and artistic works by providing fair compensation to authors
for their contributions, while achieving the more important governmental purpose of
promoting dissemination of creative works for the benefit of the public.
13. Comment, Commissioned Works As Works Made For Hire Under the 1976
Copyright Act: Misinterpretationand Injustice, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 1281, 1282 n.9

(1987) [hereinafter Commissioned Works] (quoting H.R. REP. No. 2222, 60th Cong.,
2d Sess. 7 (1909)).
14. The 1909 Act's work for hire provision stated, "the author shall include
an employer in the case of works made for hire." 1909 Act, supra note 4.
The 1976 Act's work for hire provision states:
A 'work made for hire' is(1) a work prepared by an employee within the scope of his or her
employment; or
(2) a work specially ordered or commissioned for use as: [1] a contribution
to a collective work, [2] as a part of a motion picture or other audiovisual
work, [31as a translation, [4] as a supplementary work, [5] as a compilation,
[6] as an instructional text, [7] as a test, [8] as answer material for a test,
or [9] as an atlas, if the parties expressly agree in a written instrument
signed by them that the work shall be considered a work made for hire.
17 U.S.C. § 101 (1982).
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by copyright law. When a work qualifies as work for hire under the

statute, copyright ownership, which would normally vest in the artist,
shifts from the artist to the employer or commissioning party.,' Thus,
copyright law strikes a balance between artists' and employers' or
commissioning parties' rights by assigning entitlement to the copyright

to the statutory "author."

The 1909 Act proved to be problematic because it did not define
"works made for hire.' ' 6 As the courts dealt with this
phrase
the

definitional task, the phrase was broadly construed to mean that work

created by an artist and subsequently sold was work for hire, and the
7
copyright in the work was presumed assigned to the buyer. This
interpretation placed artists in a disadvantaged position, because the

work had to be disseminated in order to earn a living. When this
occurred, the work for hire doctrine dictated that the artist relinquished copyright in the work to the buyer. 8
In response to this inequity, Congress included a definition of
work for hire in the 1976 Act's work for hire provision.

9

Section 101

of the 1976 Act on its face provides two ways for a work to qualify
as work for hire: (1) work prepared within the scope of employment
15. 17 U.S.C. § 201 provides:
(a) Initial Ownership. Copyright in a work protected under this title vests
initially in the author or authors of the work. The authors of a joint work
are co-owners of copyright in the work.
(b) Works Made for Hire. In the case of a work made for hire, the
employer or other person for whom the work was prepared is considered
the author for purposes of this title, and, unless the parties have expressly
agreed otherwise in a written instrument signed by them, owns all of the
rights comprised in the copyright.
17 U.S.C. § 201 (1982).
Typically an artist is entitled to copyright ownership of her work, but employers
or commissioning parties should be entitled to the copyright when they bear the
primary burdens involved in creating a work. The 1909 Act and 1976 Act address
these situations by shifting the presumption of copyright from artists to employers
or commissioning parties.
16. See supra note 14.
17. Easter Seal Society for Crippled Children and Adults of La., Inc. v. Playboy
Enters., 815 F.2d 323, 327 (5th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 981 (1988). See
infra notes 45-56 and accompanying text. Prior to the 1976 Act, a mere right to
control or supervise an artist's work was sufficient to create an employment relationship and vest the "employer" with the copyright. See, e.g., Picture Music, Inc. v.
Bourne, Inc., 457 F.2d 1213, 1216 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 997 (1972);
Brattleboro Publishing Co. v. Winmill Publishing Corp., 369 F.2d 565, 567-68 (2d
Cir. 1966).
18. See infra notes 49-53 and accompanying text.
19. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
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(the employee clause), and (2) work specially ordered or commissioned

that falls within one of nine categories of commissioned works and
that is subject to an agreement by both parties that it shall be work
for hire (the independent contractor clause). 20 Section 201 of the 1976
Act vests initial copyright ownership in the author or authors of a
work. 2' Section 201 also implements the work for hire clause of
section 101 by specifying that in the case of work for hire, the
employer or other person for whom the work was prepared is considered the author and owns the copyright. 22
The 1976 Act's work for hire provision represents an attempt to
strike a compromise between the interests of artists and commissioning
23

parties.

Traditional employees did not factor heavily in the reform

because the common law had long viewed work performed within the

scope of employment as belonging to the employer. 24 The primary

impetus came from artists who opposed the inclusion of any commissioned works in the definition of work for hire because past experience
had shown the negative effect on artists of a presumption favoring a
finding of employment. 25 Artists typically lack the economic power to
resist signing away their rights in contracts designating their work
"for hire," and, where hiring parties have a large number of artists
to choose from, artists must accept work for hire contract clauses if
they are to obtain a commission to do the work at all. 26 Thus, artists
20. See supra note 14.
21. 17 U.S.C. § 201(a) (1982).
22. 17 U.S.C. § 201(b) (1982). See supra note 15.
23. H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 121, reprinted in 1976 U.S.
CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS (90 Stat.) 5659, 5736-37. The 1976 Act's work for hire
provision is the result of a series of studies, discussion, debate, and negotiation
spanning twenty years and represents a carefully balanced compromise between
competing interests. See also GOLDSTEIN, supra note 11, at 652-53.
24. See infra note 45 and accompanying text.
25. See infra notes 45-56 and accompanying text.
26. Commissioned Works, supra note 13, at 1308-09 n.141. See also Comment,
Free Lance Artists, Works Made for Hire, and the Copyright Act of 1976, 15 U.C.
DAVIS L. REV. 703, 705 n.7 (1982). For example, work for hire clauses have become

the norm in magazine publishing contracts. Although well-known freelancers enjoy
an equal bargaining power with their publishers, the majority of artists are less well
known and are at the mercy of the publisher regarding the particular contractual
provisions to which they agree. Commissioned Works, supra note 13, at 1309. See
HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY,

PT.

2:

88TH CONG.,

IST SESS.,

COPYRIGHT LAW REVISION,

DISCUSSION AND COMMENTS ON REPORT OF THE REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS ON
THE GENERAL REVISION OF THE U.S. COPYRIGHT LAW (H. Comm. Print 1963),
reprinted in 3 OMNIBUS COPYRIGHT REVISION LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, 152-53 (1976)

(remarks of Irwin Karp for The Authors League of America, Inc.) [hereinafter 3
OMNIBUS]; id. at 106-07, 393 (remarks of John Schulman).
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felt the presumption of copyright should favor them when the work
was commissioned so they could have a greater amount of control or
bargaining power to keep the copyright in their works. Therefore,
which clearly specified when
artists argued in favor of a provision
27

works can be deemed work for hire.

On the other hand, commissioning parties, particularly those

involved in publishing and motion picture productions, argued they
to rely on a
should be entitled to copyright because of their need
2
number of artists to produce one complete work. 1 If individual
contributors were given initial copyright in their respective contribu-

tions, the commissioning party would have to obtain authorization to

reproduce from every artist before the complete work could be
29
disseminated and would leave artists with too much control. Thus,
commissioning parties strongly opposed the first30 definition of work

for hire which excluded all commissioned works.
A compromise between artists and commissioning parties was
reached with the nine categories of commissioned works enumerated

in the statute which are eligible to be work for hire. The hiring party
can be the deemed the "author" of only those categories of work
and only when he has obtained a written agreement designating the
work as work for hire.3 As a result, the 1976 Act's definition of

work for hire provided a basis for radical change in the then existing
work for hire law because the independent contractor clause on its

face abandoned the presumption of work for hire in the buyer by
limiting the kinds of commissioned works that could be deemed work
27. See Dumas v. Gommerman, 865 F.2d 1093, 1099 (9th Cir. 1989); 3 OMNIBUS,
supra note 26, at 260-61 (prepared statement of The Authors League of America,
Inc.).
28. See Dumas, 865 F.2d at 1099. A work produced by a commissioner
incorporating a number of commissioned works may be valuable because it is a
collection of work rather than because of the individual contributions. Under the
1909 Act, commissioning parties enjoyed a strong presumption of copyright in their
favor because of courts' willingness to find employer-employee relationships, but
under the 1976 Act, this presumption was abandoned. See, e.g., 3 OMNmus, supra
note 26, at 358-59 (prepared statement of the Motion Picture Ass'n of America,
Inc.).
29. See Litman, Copyright, Compromise and Legislative History, 72 CORNELL
L. REV. 857, 890 (1987).
30. Commissioned Works, supra note 13, at 1291. In addition, allowing an
independent contractor who only submitted a small portion of the complete work to
be entitled to copyright in that work allows artists to obtain a greater value than that
of their contribution without sharing in the burden of expense commissioning parties
sustain in producing their work.
31. See definition of work for hire supra note 14.
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for hire.12 However, reluctance on the part of some courts and
commentators to accept a radical change in copyright law resulted in
a controversy over Congress' intent.33 Specifically, courts differed
over whether Congress intended to overhaul the then existing copyright
law-referred to as the "radical view" or "literal interpretation ' 34 or
whether the Act was only a further restriction on the employer or
commissioning party-referred to as the "conservative interpretation." 35
The literal interpretation of the 1976 Act recognizes the difference
between employees and independent contractors by first inquiring
whether the artist is an employee or independent contractor as determined under agency law. Once determined, the proper clause is
applied. Under the employee clause of the 1976 Act, work produced
by an employee within the scope of employment is "authored" by
the employer and copyright vests in the employer. Under the inde32. See Dumas v. Gommerman, 865 F.2d 1093, 1096-97 (9th Cir. 1989) ("[T]he
legislative history of the 1976 Act and the Act's inclusion of a definition of 'works
made for hire' demonstrate that Congress did not intend a continuation of the status
quo.").

33. See infra notes 62-67 and accompanying text. Compare Commissioned

Works, supra note 13, (arguing for a literal interpretation of the 1976 Act) with

O'Meara, "Works Made for Hire" Under the Copyright Act of 1976-Two Interpretations, 15 CREIGHTON L. REv. 523 (1982) (arguing for a conservative interpretation

which would leave case law prior to the 1976 Act undisturbed as to its precedential
value).
34. See, e.g., Easter Seal Society for Crippled Children and Adults of La., Inc.
v. Playboy Enters., 815 F.2d 323, 329 (5th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 981
(1988) (court's discussion of the literal interpretation). A number of courts have
adopted this interpretation. See, e.g., Whelan Assocs., Inc. v. Jaslow Dental Lab.,
609 F. Supp. 1307, 1319 (D.C. Pa. 1985), aff'd on other grounds, 797 F.2d 1222
(3rd Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1031 (1987) (work for hire only applies to
independent contractors in the limited circumstances defined by the Act); Everts v.
Arkham House Publishers, Inc., 579 F. Supp. 145, 148 (W.D. Wis. 1984) (employeremployee relationship absent so independent contractor clause should be applied);
Childers v. High Society Magazine, Inc., 557 F. Supp. 978, 984 (S.D.N.Y. 1983)
(independent contractor's work may be deemed work for hire only if the parties
expressly agree in a written instrument); BPI Systems, Inc. v; Leith, 532 F. Supp.
208, 210 (W.D. Tex. 1981) (absent written agreement independent contractor's work
cannot be work for hire); Mister B Textiles, Inc. v. Woodcrest Fabrics, Inc., 523 F.
Supp. 21, 24 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (only certain categories of commissioned works can be
work for hire); Meltzer v. Zoller, 520 F. Supp. 847, 854-55 (D.N.J. 1981) (work of
independent contractor may be work for hire only where it falls within one of the
statutory categories and the parties enter into an express written agreement that it
shall be work for hire, quoting 17 U.S.C. § 101).
35. See Easter Seal Society, 815 F.2d at 331 (court's discussion of the conservative interpretation).
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pendent contractor clause, work specially ordered or commissioned is
not work for hire unless the work falls within one of the nine
enumerated categories, and then only where the parties have agreed
36
in a written instrument that it shall be work for hire.
The conservative interpretation retains the principles embodied in
the case law under the 1909 Act3 7 and views the 1976 Act as providing
merely another method whereby work can be deemed work for hire.
All work regardless of preparation by an employee or independent
contractor is first analyzed under the employee clause to determine if
it was the work of an employee. This analysis retains the broad
construction given the term "employee" under the 1909 Act so that
work is deemed work for hire if it is prepared at the "instance and
expense" of the hiring party.38 In the rare event that the work was
not determined to be the work of an employee, analysis would
continue under the independent contractor clause. The hiring party
could be deemed the author and obtain copyright of only the kinds
of work within the nine categories enumerated in the clause and only
where there was a written agreement designating the work "for hire." 3 9
Although the definition of work for hire was incorporated into
the 1976 Act, Congress left a new ambiguity by failing to define its
use of the term "employee." ' 4 Indeed, since the 1976 Act came into
effect, the term has been interpreted variably by the'courts . 4 The
Supreme Court granted certiorari in Community for Creative NonViolence v. Reid to resolve the controversy over the meaning of the
term "employee" as used in the 1976 Act. 42 The Court determined
that the term "employee" is to be understood in the context of agency

36. See, e.g., id. at 329 (court's discussion of the literal interpretation referring
to 17 U.S.C. § 101).
37. See infra notes 45-56 and accompanying text.
38. See infra notes 50 and 53.
39. See Easter Seal Society, 815 F.2d at 331. However, this interpretation fails
to recognize that the 1976 Act's work for hire provision was developed because of
the inadequate protection afforded artists under the 1909 Act.
40. See Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 109 S. Ct. 2166, 2172
(1989).
41. See infra notes 64-92 and accompanying text.
42. 109 S.Ct. 2166 (1989). The Supreme Court has been notably silent on
work for hire issues and never addressed the work for hire issue when the 1909 Act
was in effect. The Supreme Court last addressed the work for hire issue in Bleistein
v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 248 (1903) (three artworks to be
used as advertisements were copyrightable by the plaintiff employers "having been
produced by persons employed and paid by plaintiff's in their establishment to make
those very things").
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law principles and that the literal interpretation of the 1976 Act is the
4
proper construction of Congress' intent. 1
This note recounts the history of the 1976 Act, analyzes the
Court's resolution of the controversy over interpretation of the 1976
Act, and evaluates the impact of this decision on artists generally and
computer software developers specifically. As society increasingly
relies on computer software, 44 the extent to which software development "artists" can rely on the work for hire doctrine becomes
important. This note contends the Supreme Court's decision in Reid
provides a uniform standard for analyzing work for hire issues and
provides predictability to those involved in contract negotiations.
II.
A.

HISTORY

THE COPYRIGHT ACT OF 1909

Prior to the 1909 Act, the common law created a presumption
that an employer owned the copyright in work produced by employees. 45 This presumption extended to situations where work was commissioned.4 6 The 1909 Act codified the common law presumption by
including a work for hire provision designating an employer as the
author of employee work, 47 and as such, the employer became the
initial copyright holder.4 8 The statute did not specifically include
commissioned work, and the phrase "works made for hire" was
broadly construed to encompass commissioned work as well as employee work, following an instance and expense test: work created at
the instance and expense of the hiring party was work for hire. 9 The
presumption developed that an artist, employed or commissioned,
43. Reid, 109 S. Ct. at 2178.
44. See Comment, Work for Hire Dilemma, supra note 3, at 1253.
45. See, e.g., Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239 (1903).
46. Diehlman v. White, 102 F. 892 (C.C.D. Mass. 1900). "That the patron has
a right to make and permit, to any extent, reproductions of the work of art sold to
him, appears to me plain, unless the contrary is plainly set out in the contract." Id.
at 894. The common law presumption, therefore, left artists with a heavy burden of
proving the non-existence of employment.
47. The 1909 Act's work for hire provision stated, "the author shall include
an employer in the case of works made for hire." 1909 Act, supra note 4. For a
brief but accurate history of copyright law leading up to the Constitution and through
the 1909 hearings, see Fred Fisher Music Co. v. M. Witmark & Sons, 318 U.S. 643,
647-56 (1943).
48. See 1909 Act supra note 4.
49. See infra notes 50 and 53.
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intended the hiring party to hold the copyright in the work. °
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals in Yardley i Houghton
Mifflin Co." broadened the presumption favoring buyers by ruling
2
that the artist presumptively assigned his copyright to the buyer.
Thus, a person paying an artist to create copyrightable Work became
the statutory author. 3 This presumption became very difficult to
50. See Easter Seal Society for Crippled Children and Adults of La., Inc. v.
Playboy Enters., 815 F.2d 323, 325 (5th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 981 (1988);
Commissioned Works, supra note 13, at 1283-84. Early disputes concerning photographs were responsible for the development of the presumption that the artist
intended the buyer to hold the copyright. See Cory v. Physical Culture Hotel, 88
F.2d 411 (2d Cir. 1937) (defendant purchased copyrighted aerial photographs of a
hotel and subsequently copied without authorization); Lumiere v. Robertson-Cole
Distributing Corp., 280 F. 550 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 259 U.S. 583 (1922) (defendant
paid for photographs and negatives so entitled to copyright despite fact that they
were taken at plaintiff's studio); Lumiere v. Pathe Exchange, 275 F. 428 (2d Cir.
1921) (company which engaged services of photographer was within its rights to
allow photographer to retain copyright in photographs).
Subsequent cases broadly found employment relationships to exist so that
commissioned works fell within the 1909 Act's work for hire provision. The court in
Brattleboro Publishing Co. v. Winmill Publishing Corp., 369 F.2d 565, 567-68 (2d
Cir. 1966), aided the broadening definition of employee when it found a commissioned
work to be employee work because it was produced at the instance and expense of
the hiring party. Three years later in Scherr v. Universal Match Corp., 417 F.2d 497,
500-01 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 936 (1970), the court articulated a right
to control test in which the right to direct and supervise the manner in which the
work was being performed was the essential factor in determining if the work was
created within the scope of employment. See also infra note 53.
51. 108 F.2d 28 (2d Cir. 1939), cert. denied, 309 U.S. 686 (1940) (copyright
infringement suit by painter who created a mural and sold it to the city of New
York).
52. In accepting the commission to paint a mural on a building, the artist was
presumed to have assigned his copyright to the buyer. The court restated the rule of
the previous cases:
If [an artist] is solicited by a patron to execute a commission for pay, the
presumption should be indulged that the patron desires to control the
publication of copies and that the artist consents that he may, unless by the
terms of the contract, express or implicit, the artist has reserved the copyright
to himself.
Yardley v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 108 F.2d 28, 31 (2d Cir. 1939), cert. denied, 309
U.S. 686 (1940).
53. Relying on Yardley, the Second Circuit in Brattleboro Publishing Co. v.
Windmill Publishing Corp., 369 F.2d 565 (2d Cir. 1966) was the first court to extend
the presumption to an independent contractor and later did the same in Picture
Music, Inc. v. Bourne, Inc. 457 F.2d 1213 (2d. Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 997
(1972). Finally in Siegel v. National Periodical Publications, Inc., 508 F.2d 909 (2d
Cir. 1974), the Second Circuit articulated its instance and expense test: where the
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rebut, as illustrated by the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals decision in

Murray v. Gelderman.14 In Murray, the author of a book written

under contract contended she had specifically contracted for complete
control over her work. Reservation of complete control by the book
author would rebut the presumption that she intended the publisher
to hold the copyright and that she was not preparing the work at the
publisher's instance and expense. However, the court was unper-

suaded. The court held that the book was work for hire, because

allowing the author to succeed with the argument that she was not
under the publisher's right to control would "permit employees to
circumvent the work for hire doctrine simply by demanding creative

freedom as a condition of employment.""
The broad definition given the term "employee" in cases arising
under the 1909 Act included almost any artist within its scope regardless of employee or independent contractor status. 6 Thus, artists'
rights to maintain copyright in their work were virtually unprotected,
which provided little incentive to engage in the scientific and artistic
development the Constitution intended to foster and protect. Consequently, Congress promulgated the Copyright Act of 1976.
B.

THE COPYRIGHT ACT OF 1976

When Congress undertook reform of the entire copyright law in
57
the 1950s, the work for hire provision was an important issue.
Congress began by appropriating funds for an extensive study phase
which took place between 1955 and 1961 by the Copyright Office.58
"work is produced at the instance and expense of the employer, or, in other words,
when the 'motivating factor in producing the work was the employer who induced

the creation . . . ."' the work for hire doctrine applies. Siegel, 508 F.2d at 914. See
also supra note 50.

54. 566 F.2d 1307 (5th Cir. 1978).
55. Murray v. Gelderman, 566 F.2d 1307, 1311 (5th Cir. 1978).
56. See Easter Seal Society for Crippled Children and Adults of La., Inc. v.
Playboy Enters., 815 F.2d 323, 327 (5th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 981 (1988)
(artists had the heavy burden of rebutting the presumption of copyright in the buyer,
and they could never be sure they were actually keeping the copyright in their work).
57. Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 109 S. Ct. 2166, 2174
(1989). See also text accompanying note 93; Commissioned Works, supra note 13, at
1290-94. For a brief overview of the copyright law revision from 1901 to 1954, see
SENATE COMM.

ON THE JUDICIARY,

86TH CONG.,

IST SESS.,

STUDIES PREPARED FOR

THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON PATENTS, TRADEMARKS AND COPYRIGHTS PURSUANT TO S. RES.

53,

STUDY No. I (Comm. Print 1963), reprinted in
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 1-14 (1976).

58. HOUSE

I

OMNIBUS COPYRIGHT REVISION

COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 89TH CONG.,

IST SESS.,

COPYRIGHT LAW
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The legislative phase began in 1961, and by 1965, the reform proposal
of the work for hire provision was substantially in the form which
was adopted as the 1976 Act.5 9 For various reasons unrelated to the
work for hire provision, the Act was not passed until 1976. 60 The
1976 Act's work for hire provision was the result of a number of
compromises between the interests of artists and commissioning parties which culminated in a definition of work for hire as: work
prepared by an employee within the scope of his or her employment;
or, work specially ordered or commissioned when the work falls
within one of nine categories of commissioned works and the parties
expressly agree in a written instrument that it shall be work for hire. 61
The inclusion of a definition of work for hire in the 1976 Act
resolved the problem that almost all works were deemed work for
hire under the 1909 Act. However, another problem was created
because "employee" is not explicitly defined in the 1976 Act. 62 This

REVISION,

PT.

6,

SUPPLEMENTARY

REPORT OF THE REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS ON THE

GENERAL REVISION OF THE U.S. COPYRIGHT LAW: 1965 REVISION BILL (H. Comm.
Print 1965), reprinted in 4 OMNIBUS COPYRIGHT REVISION LEGISLATIVE HISTORY ix

(1976) [hereinafter 4 OMNIBUS]; GOLDSTEIN, supra note 11, at 652-53. The Copyright
Office produced the 1961 Report of the Register of Copyrights on the General

Revision of the U.S. Copyright Law.
IST SESS.,

HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 87TH CONG.,
REPORT OF THE REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS ON THE GENERAL REVISION OF

THE U.S. COPYRIGHT LAW (H. Comm. Print 1961) reprinted in 3 OMNIBUS COPYRIGHT
REVISION LEGISLATIVE HISTORY (1976).

59. Reid, 109 S. Ct. at 2174-77; 4 OMNIBUS, supra note 58, at ix. The work for
hire provisions were formulated by the Copyright office between 1961 and 1966, with
affected interests expressing their views. 2 Guide to Computer Cases (CCH) 1 60,018
at 80,067 (June 18, 1989). The only change which occurred in the proposal after 1965
was the expansion, from four to nine, of the categories of commissioned works
eligible to be works for hire. See, e.g., Commissioned Works, supra note 13, at 1292.
The legislative history of the 1976 Act demonstrates that the work for hire
doctrine was not intended to cover commissioned work. Specifically, the 1963
preliminary draft bill excluded all commissioned works from the definition of work
for hire. Reid, 109 S. Ct. at 2175. The bill, however, met with strong opposition
from book publishers and motion picture producers. See Reid, 109 S. Ct. at 2175
(discussion of legislative history); 2 Guide to Computer Cases (CCH) 60,018 at
80,067 (June 18, 1989). These parties argued that a wide range of commissioned
works are prepared at the employer's initiative, risk, and direction and therefore,
should be given work for hire status. See also Commssioned Works, supra note 13,
at 1291-92. Thus, a compromise was reached by allowing some commissioned works
to be works for hire in certain circumstances.
60. See Commissioned Works, supra note 13, at 1307 n.135.
61. See supra note 14.
62. See id.; Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 109 S. Ct. 2166,
2175 (1989).

NORTHERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 10

lack of definition allowed the courts to render different interpretations
of the meaning of "employee" in work for hire situations. 63 Specifically, four interpretations emerged as to the appropriate test for
determining who is an employee under the terms of the 1976 Act.
These tests can be classified as: (1) the right to control test, 64 (2) the
formal salaried employee test, 65 (3) the actual control test, 66 and (4)
67
the literal interpretation.
C.

FOUR INTERPRETATIONS

1. The Right to Control Test
According to the right to control test, work is prepared by an
employee whenever the employer or commissioning party retains the
right to control the work, and copyright then rests with the employer
or commissioning party. The right to control test was applied in Town
of Clarkstown v. Reeder"8 and Peregrinev. Lauren Corp.69 In Clarkstown, the defendant volunteered a large amount of time to draft a
manual for the Youth Court being established in the city. Although
the defendant was the primary writer, other volunteers from the
municipality contributed to the manual as well. After conflicts arose
regarding the Youth Court project, the defendant obtained a copyright
for the manual, the validity of which the city contested.70 The court
held the copyright invalid because "the contribution of others included
not only ideas and suggestions but also direct control and monitoring
of [the defendant's] expression of his own thoughts."'" Because the
municipality retained the right to control the defendant's work, he
was an employee, his work was "for hire," and the municipality was
entitled to the copyright.
63. See infra text accompanying notes 64-67. Different interpretations were
established despite the following language in the 1976 final bill: "The definition now
provided by the bill represents a compromise which, in effect, spells out those specific
categories of commissioned works that can be considered 'works made for hire' under
certain circumstances." S. REP. No. 473, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 105 (1976); H.R.
REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 121, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADmiN. NEws 5659, 5737. See also Commissioned Works, supra note 13, at 1292.
64. See infra text accompanying notes 68-74.
65. See infra text accompanying notes 75-78.
66. See infra text accompanying notes 79-84.
67. See infra text accompanying notes 85-92.
68. 566 F. Supp. 137 (S.D.N.Y. 1983).
69. 601 F. Supp. 828 (D. Colo. 1985).
70. Town of Clarkstown v. Reeder, 566 F. Supp. 137, 140 (S.D.N.Y. 1983).
71. See Clarkstown, 566 F. Supp. at 142.
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In Peregrine, an advertising agency hired the services of a pro-

fessional photographer. The agency retained the right to direct and
supervise the photographer's work as well as the right to reject any
photographs unsuitable for their purposes. The photographer brought
suit against the agency to compel payment for his work, claiming his

copyright in the photographs allowed him to withhold authorization
for the agency to use the photographs.12 The court ruled in favor of

the agency because the agency had the right to direct and supervise

the work. 73 Therefore, the photographer's work was work for hire
and the agency, not the photographer, was entitled to the copyright. 74
2.

The Formal SalariedEmployee Test

Turning to the formal salaried employee test, the term "em-

ployee" is construed narrowly so that the class of employer-employee

relationships is stricter than that which existed under the 1909 Act.
The formal salaried employee test was expounded by the Ninth Circuit

Court of Appeals in Dumas v. Gommerman.71 In Dumas, a nonsalaried graphic artist had prepared a series of four lithographs based
upon sketches the hiring party gave him of the desired work. The
court construed the work for hire provision so narrowly that the artist
was held not to be an employee because he was not a formal, salaried
employee, even though the defendant had significantly controlled and

directed the work by supplying the artist with sketches of the desired
work. 76 The court described its interpretation of the Act: "Only the

works of formal, salaried employees are covered by [the employee

clause]. Only certain types of specially commissioned works qualify
77
as 'work made for hire' under [the independent contractor clause]."
72. Peregrine v. Lauren Corp., 601 F. Supp. 828 (D. Colo. 1985).
73. Id.at 829.
74. Id. The court also alluded to the idea that copyright vests in the person at
whose instance and expense the work is done. Id. See discussion of instance and
expense test, supra notes 50 and 53.
75. 865 F.2d 1093 (9th Cir. 1989). The Register of Copyrights favored this
interpretation in their amicus curiae brief for Respondent Reid in CCNV. v. Reid,
reprinted in 2 Guide to Computer Cases (CCH) 60,018 (June 18, 1989).
76. Dumas v. Gommerman, 865 F.2d 1093, 1105 (9th Cir. 1989).
77. Id. at 1102. However, in its application of this test, the court announced a
number of factors to evaluate in determining whether a person is a formal, salaried
employee. Id. at 1105. See infra note 133 and accompanying text. These factors are
similar to those enumerated in the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 220 for
determining who is an employee for agency law purposes. See infra note 124. The
court agreed with the literal interpretation, but enumerated its own factors because
the use of agency law factors could result in the classification of some independent
contractors as employees.
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The court adopted a strict definition of "employee" because application of the literal interpretation could have favored the hiring party.
The court sought to maintain the distinction between employees and
independent contractors and found the potential classification of some
independent contractors as employees under the Restatement (Second)
78
of Agency factors to be an improper result.
3.

The Actual Control Test

A third test for determining who is an employee for work for
hire purposes evaluates whether actual control was exhibited over the
work. The employer or commissioning party must actually supervise
and control the work before the person performing the work is
considered to be an employee and the "employer" becomes entitled
to copyright.7 9 Under this test the court analyzes the independent
contractor clause of the 1976 Act only when the work does not qualify
as work for hire under the employee clause. In cases where the
independent contractor clause is reached, the commissioning party
must supervise and control the kinds of work enumerated in the
clause. Otherwise, the commissioning party may not obtain copyright
in the work.80 The actual control test was first articulated by the
Second Circuit Court of Appeals in Aldon Accessories Ltd. v. Spiegel,
Inc.8" In that case, Aldon Accessories had created a line of porcelain
and brass statuettes of mythological figures for sale to the public. A
Taiwanese firm had produced the brass statuettes for Aldon Accessories. At a retail show, a representative of Spiegel, the defendant,
showed great interest in the brass statuettes. Subsequently, Spiegel
began marketing a line of brass statuettes substantially similar to
those of Aldon. Spiegel attempted to assert the work for hire doctrine
as a defense to Aldon's suit for infringement of copyright, claiming
Aldon was not an author because an independent contractor had
produced the statuettes, and statuary is not included in the nine
78. Dumas, 865 F.2d at 1104.
79. Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 109 S. Ct. 2166, 2173-74

(1989).
80. Aldon Accessories Ltd. v. Spiegel, Inc., 738 F.2d 548, 552-53 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 469 U.S. 982 (1984). This test does not ignore the provisions of the
independent contractor clause, but the broad sweep this interpretation gives the
employee clause effectively precludes meaningful application of the independent
contractor clause of the Act. For further reading on the merits of this interpretation,
see Commissioned Works, supra note 13 at 1298-1303 (arguing case was correctly
decided but based on an improper interpretation of the 1976 Act).
81. 738 F.2d 548 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 982 (1984).
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categories of the independent contractor clause.82 The court rejected
this assertion and formulated the actual control test: an employment
relationship exists where the commissioning party supervises and
controls the work."3 The court found Aldon to be the author based
on the fact that a principal of Aldon was intricately involved in
directing the Taiwanese firm in the design of the statuettes .14
4.

The Literal Interpretation

The fourth test-and the test most favorable to the artist-that
was developed for determining the meaning of employee is the literal
interpretation. The first inquiry of the court is whether the person is
an employee or independent contractor according to the federal
common law of agency.s Once done, the proper section of the 1976
Act, the employee clause or the independent contractor clause, is
applied. The employee clause favors the employer with a presumption
of copyright in work that is prepared within the scope of employment. 6 The independent contractor clause favors the artist with a
presumption of copyright by limiting the kinds of work eligible to be
work for hire and by further requiring that a written agreement
designate the commissioned work as work for hire. 7 The Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeals in Easter Seal Society for Crippled Children &
Adults of Louisiana, Inc. v. Playboy Enterprises" adopted the literal
interpretation. In Easter Seal Society, a public television station (the
artist) was commissioned to videotape a staged Mardi Gras-style
parade and to produce a master tape from the field footage shot.
Some time later, the station received a request for Mardi Gras footage
and sent the producer who made the request some of the field footage
left over from the Mardi Gras project. The footage was used in an
"adult" film. Easter Seal Society (the hiring party) brought suit
against the station (the artist) for copyright infringement. 9 The court
82. Aldon Accessories, 738 F.2d at 551.
83. Id. at 552-53.
84. Id. at 553.
85. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
86. However, where the employer is so inclined, an employee can be granted
the copyright in her work.
87. See supra note 14.
88. 815 F.2d 323, 337 (5th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 981 (1988). The
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit adopted this view in Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 846 F.2d 1485 (D.C. Cir. 1988), aff'd,
109 S. Ct. 2166 (1989).
89. Easter Seal Society for Crippled Children and Adults of La., Inc. v. Playboy
Enters., 815 F.2d 323, 325 (5th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 981 (1988).
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held the station was not an employee of Easter Seal Society but an
independent contractor. 9° Videotape footage falls within the second
category of commissioned works, 9' but there was no written agreement
between Easter Seal Society and the television station that the footage
would be work for hire, so the copyright rested with the station. 92
Of the four tests, the legislative history best supports the literal
interpretation of the 1976 Act's work for hire provision as the
construction intended by Congress. The House Report states:
The status of works prepared on special order or commission
was a major issue in the development of the definition of
'works made for hire' in section 101, which has undergone
extensive revision during the legislative process. The basic
problem is how to draw a statutory line between those works
written on special order or commission that should be considered as 'works made for hire,' and those that should not. The
definition now provided by the bill represents a compromise
which, in effect, spells out those specific categories of commissioned works that can be considered 'works made for hire'
under certain circumstances. 93
Commissioned works had not been included in the original 1909 Act, 94
but the broad interpretation of the term "employee" by the courts
more often than not resulted in commissioned works being construed
to be employee work. 95 The 1976 Act narrowed the meaning to be
attributed to "employee" while incorporating a way for certain types
of commissioned work to qualify as work for hire." This compromise
was intended to provide adequate protection to artists and commissioning parties in those situations where copyright should, in all
fairness, be granted to the respective parties.
Opposition to the literal interpretation is based on the idea that
Congress would have never intended such a radical change in copyright
law, thereby destroying the precedents that had developed. 97 However,
90. Id. at 336.
91. See supra note 14.
92. Easter Seal Society, 815 F.2d at 325, 337.

93. H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 121 (1976), reprinted in 1976
5737.
94. See supra note 14.
95. See supra notes 45-56 and accompanying text.
96. See supra note 14.
97. See Aldon Accessories Ltd. v. Spiegel, Inc., 738 F.2d 548, 552 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 469 U.S. 982 (1984). The work for hire presumption under the 1909 Act
strongly favored employers and commissioning parties over artists. See supra notes
45.56 and accompanying text.
U.S. CODE CoNG. & ADMIN. NEws
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that is precisely why revision was undertaken. 9 Artists were being
smothered with work for hire clauses which hiring parties were
unwilling to forego in contract negotiations, leaving the artist with
the choice of accepting the contract or risk not being hired for the
task.99
Copyright law mandates uniformity,' °° which ensures predictability to those seeking copyright protection for their works. The disparate
interpretations of the work for hire provision therefore compelled the
Supreme Court to resolve the growing discrepancy through its decision
in Reid.'0
III.

FACTS OF THE CASE

James Earl Reid is a Baltimore, Maryland sculptor. Community

for Creative Non-Violence (CCNV) is a Washington-based, nonprofit, unincorporated association dedicated to eliminating homeless-

ness in America. CCNV decided to participate in the annual Christ-

mastime Pageant of Peace in Washington, D.C., with a sculpture
entitled "Third World America" dramatizing the plight of the homeless. 0 2 Mitch Snyder, a member and trustee of CCNV, made inquiries
to locate an artist to produce the sculpture and was referred to Reid.

Through negotiation, Reid verbally agreed to create the figurine
98. H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 121 (1976), reprintedin 1976
U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 5737.
99. See Commissioned Works, supra note 13, at 1308-09.
100. See supra note 7.
101. Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 109 S. Ct. 2166, 2170-71
(1989).
102. As described by the district court:
Snyder and fellow CCNV members conceived the idea for the nature of
the display: a sculpture of a modern Nativity scene in which, in lieu of the
traditional Holy Family, the two adult figures and the infant would appear
as contemporary homeless people huddled on a streetside steam grate. The
family was to be black (most of the homeless in Washington being black);
the figures were to be life-sized, and the steam grate would be positioned
atop a platform 'pedestal,' or base, within which special effects equipment
would be enclosed to emit simulated 'steam' through the grid to swirl about
the figures. They also settled upon a title for the work-'Third World
America'-and a legend for the pedestal: 'and still there is no room at the
inn.'
Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 652 F. Supp. 1453, 1454 (D.D.C.
1987), rev'd, 846 F.2d 1485 (D.C. Cir. 1988), aff'd, 109 S. Ct. 2166 (1989).
Interestingly, the sculpture was rejected for display at the pageant due to its potentially
political message and was therefore exhibited at a nearby site. Id. at 1455 n.6.
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portion using a synthetic substance known as Design Cast 62,103 while
CCNV would construct the pedestal and steam grate for the statue. °4
The cost of the sculpture was not to exceed $15,000, excluding Reid's

donated services. CCNV's participation in the creation of the sculpture
consisted of coordination of construction of the base by CCNV and
checking on Reid's progress. At times Reid was assisted in his work
by as many as a dozen people. Reid hired these assistants who were

paid with funds from CCNV. Reid and CCNV never discussed the
matter of copyright at any time prior to, during, or after completion
of the sculpture. 105

The controversy arose when CCNV decided to tour the sculpture
in several cities for charitable purposes. Reid objected because he
believed the material with which the sculpture was constructed would
not withstand the tour.0 6Reid suggested casting the statue in bronze
or creating a master mold, but Snyder refused to spend the additional
funds such casting would require. 107 Thereafter, Reid sought to register

a copyright and refused to return the sculpture to CCNV.10 8 CCNV

also filed for copyright registration in the sculpture, and, in addition,

filed suit against Reid for possession of and copyright ownership in
the sculpture.' °9

The issue in the district court was whether Reid was an employee
or independent contractor of CCNV.110 However, the district court
103. Reid suggested bronze casting for the sculpture, but Snyder rejected the
proposal due to time and cost constraints. Use of a synthetic called "Design Cast
62" was then suggested by Reid. Tinted, this material would appear to be bronze yet
fall within CCNV's time constraint and monetary budget. Reid, 109 S. Ct. at 2169.
104. Id.
105. Reid had placed a copyright symbol on the sculpture prior to its display.
Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 652 F. Supp. 1453, 1455 n.7 (D.D.C.
1987), rev'd, 846 F.2d 1485 (D.C. Cir. 1988), aff'd, 109 S. Ct. 2166 (1989). However,
the Court of Appeals found this to be an unnecessary measure. The court ruled that
"notice of copyright is [only] required upon publication of copies of a copyrighted
work" and that display of sculpture did not constitute publication. Community for
Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 846 F.2d 1485, 1488 n.2 (D.C. Cir. 1988), aff'd, 109
S. Ct. 2166 (1989).
106. Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 109 S. Ct. 2166, 2170
(1989).
107. Id.
108. Id. The sculpture was then in Reid's possession because it had been returned
to him for minor repairs shortly after the display ended. After filing his copyright
registration, Reid "announced plans to take the sculpture on a more modest tour."

Id.

109. Id.

110. See Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 652 F. Supp. 1453,
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never reached analysis under the independent contractor clause of the
1976 Act because the court applied a "motivating factor" test to find
an employee-employer relationship."' Because CCNV was the motivating factor in the creation of "Third World America," the court
determined Reid was an employee and CCNV was entitled to copyright
112
in the work.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit reversed,
favoring the literal interpretation," 3 and held the sculpture did not
qualify as work for hire." 4 The court indicated the district court's
application of the motivating factor test was inappropriate and that
Reid was an independent contractor according to agency principles.',
Since sculpture does not fall within one of the nine categories of
works listed in the independent contractor clause of the 1976 Act, it
could not be deemed work for hire and CCNV could not obtain
copyright in the sculpture. 1 6 In addition, there was no written agreement between Reid and CCNV that the sculpture would be a work
for hire as required by the independent contractor clause.
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve the inconsistency
among the courts regarding the proper construction of the work for

1456 (D.D.C. 1987), rev'd., 846 F.2d 1485 (D.C. Cir. 1988), aff'd, 109 S. Ct. 2166

(1989).
111. This is another term for the instance and expense test which existed under
the 1909 Act. See supra notes 50 and 53. "If the putative 'employer' was either the
'motivating factor' in the production of the work, or possessed the right to 'direct
and supervise' the manner in which the work was done, the copyright is his no matter
the degree of creative license actually exercised by the artist-employee." Reid, 652 F.
Supp. at 1456.
112. Id. The court was of the opinion that Reid should have bargained with
CCNV for the copyright but failed to do so. Id. at 1457. The court issued the
injunction CCNV sought for return of the sculpture from Reid.
113. Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 846 F.2d 1485, 1494 (D.C.
Cir. 1988), aff'd, 109 S. Ct. 2166 (1989).
114. Id. at 1499. However, the court remanded the case because the sculpture
may be a joint work. Section 101 of the 1976 Act defines "joint work" as "work
prepared by two or more authors with the intention that their contributions be
merged into inseparable or interdependent parts of a unitary whole." 17 U.S.C. §
101 (1982). CCNV may qualify as a joint author of the sculpture because CCNV
contributed the pedestal and steam grate and Reid contributed the sculpture of the
figures; See Reid, 846 F.2d at 1496-97. If "Third World America" is determined to
be a joint work, Reid could be deprived of his rights as a copyright holder, because
as a co-author, CCNV would have the same rights as Reid under § 106 of the 1976
Act. See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1982).
115. See Reid, 846 F.2d at 1494.
116. Id.
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hire provision," 7 noting that "[tihe contours of the work for hire
doctrine . . . carry profound significance for freelance creatorsincluding artists, writers, photographers, designers, composers, and
computer programmers-and for the publishing, advertising, music,
and other industries which commission their works." 8

IV.
A.

ANALYSIS

THE SUPREME COURT ADOPTS THE LITERAL INTERPRETATION

The U.S. Supreme Court affirmed the position of the Court of
Appeals that "Third World America" was not a work prepared by
an employee within the scope of his or her employment."19 The Court
aligned itself with the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals' adoption of
the literal interpretation. 2 0 Employee work is authored by the employer, and an independent contractor's work is authored by commissioning parties only where the work falls within one of the nine
categories of specially ordered or commissioned works and there is a
written agreement designating the work "for hire.' ' 21 Sculpture does
not fit any of the nine categories, so the only inquiry for the Court
was whether Reid was an employee acting within the scope of his
22
employment. 1
The Court began its analysis by setting forth the principle that
unless otherwise indicated, statutory language must be interpreted
according to the established common law meaning of the terms. 2
The terms "employee" and "scope of employment" used in the work
for hire provision emanate from agency law and therefore should be

117. Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 109 S. Ct. 2166, 2170-71
(1989).
118. Id. at 2171. A classification of a work as being "for hire," in addition to
determining initial copyright ownership, determines the copyright duration and
termination rights. 17 U.S.C. §§ 302(c), 203(a) (1982). The Court mentioned a
Copyright Office study that showed as of 1955, 40% of all copyright registrations
were for works for hire. Reid, 109 S. Ct. at 2171 n.4. Thus, work for hire issues will
no doubt continue to be important in copyright law.

119. Id. at 2170-71.
120. Id. See also discussion of the Fifth Circuit decision supra text and accompanying notes 85-92.
121. Reid, 109 S. Ct. at 2171.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 2172 (quoting NLRB v. Amax Coal Co., 453 U.S. 322, 329 (1981)).
See also Perrin v. United States, 444 U.S. 37, 42 (1979).
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24
A federal rule of
understood in the context of agency principles.
agency is especially important in the context of copyright because the
1976 Act was intended to "creat[e] national uniform copyright law
by broadly pre-empting state statutory and common-law copyright
regulation."'' 25 Therefore, the terms "employee" and "scope of em-

124. Although individual states' common laws vary in the particular meanings
attributed to legal terminology, the federal judicial system has developed a common
law applicable to cases within federal jurisdiction. Thus, the meaning of "employee"
and "scope of employment" as established by the federal common law of agency
constitutes the basis upon which to evaluate the merits of copyright work for hire
claims rather than the law of any particular state. Community for Creative NonViolence v. Reid, 109 S. Ct. 2166, 2173 (1989). See, e.g., Kelly v. Southern Pac.
Co., 419 U.S. 318, 322-23 (1974) (Federal Employer's Liability Act applied to agents
of railroad); Baker v. Texas & Pac. Ry., 359 U.S. 227, 228 (1959) (federal statute
"does not use . . . 'employee'

[or] 'employed' in any special sense .

. .

,

so

[determination of] 'employee' or 'servant' [are] matters of federal law); Robinson v.
Baltimore & Ohio R.R., 237 U.S. 84, 94 (1915) ("Congress used 'employe[e]' and
'employed'

in [a] natural sense, and intended ... the conventional relation of

employer and employe[e].").

The RESTATEMENT (SECOND)

OF AGENCY

§ 220 (1958) provides factors to use for

determining employee versus independent contractor status:
(1) A servant is a person employed to perform services in the affairs of
another and who with respect to the physical conduct in the performance
of the services is subject to the other's control or right to control.
(2) In determining whether one acting for another is a servant or an
independent contractor, the following matters of fact, among others, are
considered:
(a) the extent of control which, by the agreement, the master may
exercise over the details of the work;
(b) whether or not the one employed is engaged in a distinct occupation
or business;
(c) the kind of occupation, with reference to whether, in the locality,
the work is usually done under the direction of the employer or by a
specialist without supervision;
(d) the skill required in the particular occupation;
(e) whether the employer or the workman supplies the instrumentalities,
tools, and the place of work for the person doing the work;
(f) the length of time for which the person is employed;
(g) the method of payment, whether by the time or by the job;
(h) whether or not the work is a part of the regular business of the
employer;
(i) whether or not the parties believe they are creating the relation of
master and servant; and
(j) whether the principal is or is not in business.
Id.
125. Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 109 S. Ct. 2166, 2173
(1989). See also supra text accompanying notes 7-8.
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ployment" in the context of copyright are to be defined according to
the federal common law of agency. 26
The Court evaluated the merits of each of the four interpretations
before reaching its conclusion favoring the literal interpretation. The
right to control test was eliminated without analysis of case law 27
because it ignored the difference created in the 1976 Act between
employees and independent contractors. 12 The test classified any
specially ordered or commissioned work which is subject to the
supervision and control of the hiring party as a work for hire under
the employee clause, when analysis would have appropriately fallen
within the independent contractor clause. By definition, an independent contractor's work is subject to the hiring party's control for
specification of the characteristics desired. 29 Thus, the right to control
test rendered the independent contractor clause of the Act superfluous.
The Court concluded that Congress would not have incorporated the
detailed provisions in the 1976 Act only to be ignored or overridden
by a right to control test that would unravel the 1976 Act's "carefully
worked out compromise." 30
The formal salaried employee test was eliminated by the Court
because the statutory language does not specify "formal" or "salaried" employee but simply "employee."' 3 ' Had Congress intended
this definition it would have incorporated the formal language in the
Act to prevent the inference that "employee" should be attributed its
ordinary, established meaning. 3 2 In addition, the one appellate court
to adopt this test enumerated factors from the agency law definition
of employee as considerations for determining who are formal, salaried employees.' Therefore, the formal salaried employee test is not
materially different from the literal interpretation.
126. Reid, 109 S. Ct. at 2173. This is in accord with the Court's previous
decisions in cases cited supra note 124. The Court stated the employee clause itself
indicates agency law should be used in this determination since the statutory language
"scope of employment" is a "widely used term of art in agency law." Reid, 109
S.
Ct. at 2172-73.
127. Peregrine v. Lauren Corp., 601 F. Supp. 828, 829 (D. Colo. 1985) and
Town of Clarkstown v. Reeder, 566 F. Supp. 137, 141-42 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) followed
the right to control test. See infra text accompanying notes 148-155.
128. Reid, 109 S. Ct. at 2173. See supra note 14 for statutory language.
129. Reid, 109 S. Ct. at 2173.
130. Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 109 S. Ct. 2166, 2177

(1989).

131. Id. at 2174 n.8.

132. See id.
133. Id. The factors to be considered include:
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The actual control test articulated by the Second Circuit was
eliminated by the Court as a proper method for determining employee
versus independent contractor status.134 This test confused the focus
of the employee and independent contractor clauses.

35

A controlled

and supervised worker would be deemed an employee under the
employee clause and entitle the hiring party to copyright in the work.
On the other hand, an employee who is not controlled and supervised
by the employer would not satisfy the "actual control" requirement
of the test under the employee clause, and the work could only qualify
as work for hire by satisfying the independent contractor clause, i.e.,

work within one of the nine categories plus a written agreement.
According to the Court, the test reduced the determination of em-

ployee versus independent contractor status to a single factor-actual
control exhibited by the hiring party-which disregards the plain

meaning indicated by the statute and the number of factors incorporated in the common law of agency. 136 In addition, the Court noted
that the goal of copyright law to provide predictability and certainty
in determining copyright ownership would be impeded by the actual
control test.137 Parties would be required to predict in advance the
(1) whether the artist worked in his or her own studio or on the premises
of the buyer;
(2) whether the buyer is in the regular business of creating works of the
type purchased;
(3) whether the artist works for several buyers at a time, or exclusively
for one;
(4) whether the buyer retains authority to assign additional projects to the
artist;
(5) the tax treatment of the relationship by the parties;
(6) whether the artist is hired through the channels the buyer customarily
uses for hiring new employees;
(7) whether the artist is paid a salary or wages, or is paid a flat fee; and
(8) whether the artist obtains from the buyer all benefits customarily
extendid to its regular employees.
Dumas v. Gommerman, 865 F.2d 1093, 1105 (9th Cir. 1989). Cf. supra note 124
(RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 220 (factors)).
134. Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 109 S. Ct. 2166, 2173-74
(1989).
135. See id.
136. See id. Cf. supra note 124. Since its formulation, this test has been adopted
by other courts, threatening to undermine the carefully worked out compromise
between competing interests that resulted in the 1976 Act. See, e.g., Evans Newton,
Inc. v. Chicago Systems Software, 793 F.2d 889 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S.
949 (1986); Brunswick Beacon, Inc. v. Schock-Hopchas Publishing Co., 810 F.2d
410 (4th Cir. 1987).
137. Reid, 109 S. Ct. at 2177-78.
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amount of control the hiring party would exhibit or need to exhibit
to become the author of the work. Despite such a preliminary
determination, hiring parties could later circumvent the requirements
of the independent contractor clause by simply exerting the requisite

amount of control over the work after it has begun so that it would
be deemed the work of an employee. 3
In Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, the U.S.
Supreme Court held the literal interpretation to be the proper con-

struction of the Act, based upon the legislative history. 3 9 The nego-

tiation and compromise between artists and hiring parties resulting in
the work for hire provision indicate that the independent contractor
clause was intended to apply to those limited circumstances where the

commissioning party should be entitled to copyright in the work.140
Only work falling within the enumerated categories of commissioned

works and agreed to by the artist may qualify as work for hire. 14
The Court stated the fact that the 1965 draft bill 42 was enacted as
section 101 of the 1976 Act with only minor modifications indicated
that Congress intended to provide two mutually exclusive means for
works to acquire work for hire status.

43

Having held the literal interpretation to be the proper construction
of the work for hire provision, the Court applied agency principles to
the facts of the case to determine whether Reid was an independent
138. Id. at 2178.
139. Id. at 2174.

140. Id. at 2174-77. See Litman, supra note 29, at 862; supra notes 28-30 and

accompanying text.

141. See Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 109 S. Ct. 2166, 217677 (1989).
142. The 1963 preliminary draft bill excluded all commissioned works from the

definition of work for hire. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 88TH CONG., 2D SEss.,
COPYRIGHT LAW REVISION, PT. 3, PRELIMINARY DRAFT FOR REVISED U.S.
COPYRIGHT
LAW AND DISCUSSIONS AND COMMENTS ON THE DRAFT (H.
Comm. P'int 1964),
reprinted in 3 OMNIBUS' COPYRIGHT REVISION LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 15 n. I1(1976).
Strong opposition by book publishers resulted in the 1964 revision bill which expanded
the work for hire doctrine by including commissioned works if the parties agreed in
writing. HousE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 89TH CONG., IST SESS., COPYRIGHT LAW
REVISION, PT. 5, 1964 REvISION BML WITH DISCUSSIONS AND COMMENTS (H. Comm.
Print 1965), reprinted in 4 OMNBUS COPYRIGHT REVISION LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, 31
(1976). Four categories were added to limit the kinds of commissioned works that
could be works for hire: as a contribution to a collective work; as a part of a motion
picture; as a translation; or, as supplementary work. 4 OMNIBUS, supra note 58, at
67. The only change after this was the expansion of the categories to the nine
enumerated in the statute. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1982).

143. See Reid, 109 S.Ct. at 2175-76.
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contractor or employee. The Court found Reid to be an independent
contractor since he was involved in a skilled occupation, worked for
CCNV for a short time, worked at an independent location, had
"freedom to decide when and how long to work," was paid for a
specific job, and "had total discretion in hiring and paying assistants. '" 14 In addition, CCNV could not be deemed the employer of
Reid because CCNV: (1) could not assign additional work to Reid;
(2) was not in any particular business, much less in the business of
creating sculptures; (3) paid no taxes, such as payroll or social security,
on behalf of Reid; and (4) paid no other employee benefits on behalf
of Reid. CCNV merely "directed enough of Reid's work to ensure"
the sculpture met their specifications. This alone was insufficient to
45
find an employee relationship in light of the other factors.' As an
independent contractor, Reid was entitled to the copyright in his
work. However, the Court remanded the case for a determination of
the issue of joint authorship which could serve to be detrimental to
Reid's copyright. 146
B.

THE OTHER INTERPRETATIONS WERE UNNECESSARY

The Supreme Court analyzed the merits of the four interpretations
and evaluated Congress' intent in the legislative history before determining the literal interpretation to be the proper construction of the
* 1976 Act. In retrospect, an evaluation of the cases that applied the
other tests reveals that the other interpretations of the 1976 Act were
unnecessary.
1 48
47
Peregrine
The right to control test applied in Clarkstown' and
under the 1976 Act is reminiscent of the instance and expense test
49 In Clarkstown, the defendant
which existed under the 1909 Act.
was found to be an employee because the municipality controlled the
15 0
work that was performed by its volunteers. The literal interpretation
would also yield a finding of employment. Applying agency principles,
the municipality exerted control over the work of its volunteers, the
defendant was not engaged in the distinct occupation of creating such
144. Id.at 2179.
145. Id.
146. Id.at 2180. See discussion of joint authorship, supra note 114.
147. Town of Clarkstown v. Reeder, 566 F. Supp. 137 (S.D.N.Y. 1983). See
supra text accompanying notes 68-71.
148. Peregrine v. Lauren, 601 F. Supp. 828 (D. Colo. 1985). See supra text
accompanying notes 72-74.
149. See discussion of instance and expense test supra notes 50 and 53.
150. Clarkstown, 566 F. Supp. at 141-42.
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manuals, and the municipality would have paid for the services of its
volunteers had funding been available. 5 ' Defendant Reeder would
more readily be deemed an employee than an independent contractor
because all the volunteers were working toward a single goalestablishment of a Youth Court. It would be inequitable to allow the
defendant to impede that goal simply because the majority of the
volunteers did not agree with his point of view. Therefore the municipality, not the defendant, was entitled to copyright in the manual
according to the literal interpretation.
In Peregrine, the court found the photographer to be an independent contractor but nevertheless applied the right to control test1 2
and held the photographer was an employee because he was subject
to the hiring party's control and direction in the work.' 53 Under the
literal interpretation, the photographer would also be deemed an
independent contractor because he engaged in a distinct profession,
providing his services to those who contracted for them. 5 4 Photographs fall within the nine categories of commissioned works, but
there is no indication that the parties had a contract designating the
work "for hire," so the photographer would have retained the
copyright under the literal interpretation. Application of the literal
interpretation thus appears to dictate a different outcome in this case,
but the parties' interests could have been served without reaching that
outcome. The photographer's purpose in bringing his lawsuit was not
to protect any copyright he held, but to compel payment for his
services. The court could have resolved this issue by dismissing the
copyright action and making the photographer sue on a contractual
theory such as quantum meruit.
For all practical purposes, the formal, salaried employee test
applied in Dumas v. Gommerman " differs from the literal interpretation in name only. The court listed a number of factors to use to
determine if a formal salaried employment relationship exists which
incorporated many of the considerations embodied in the Restatement
(Second) of Agency.' 5 6 Therefore, this test is merely an insignificant
variation of the literal interpretation.

151. See supra note 124

(RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 220 (factors)).
152. Peregrine v. Lauren, 601 F. Supp. 828, 829 (D. Colo. 1985).

153. Id.
154. See supra note 124 (RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 220 (factors)).

155. 865 F.2d 1093 (9th Cir. 1989). See supra text accompanying notes 75-78.
156. Dumas v. Gommerman, 865 F.2d 1093, 1105 (9th Cir. 1989). See also supra
notes 124 and 133.
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The Aldon Accessories decision is an anomaly in the work for

hire case law because.rather than being a suit between the artist and
hiring party over copyright entitlement, the suit was between the
hiring party and a third-party infringer.'57 Aldon was not the best
plaintiff to bring a suit for infringement. The Taiwanese firm which

produced the statuettes would have been the preferable plaintiff
because it would hold the copyright under application of the literal
interpretation. The firm is rendered an independent contractor be-

cause, although Aldon significantly controlled the firm in producing
the statuettes, the firm was engaged in a distinct occupation, supplied
their own instrumentalities, tools, and place of work, and received

work from clients other than Aldon. Statuary does not fall within the
nine categories enumerated in the independent contractor clause, and
as a result Aldon could not obtain copyright based on work for hire.
Aldon would be in a better position to assert a copyright infringement
claim had it contracted for a transfer of the copyright from the
Taiwanese firm as allowed under the statute."" The facts of the case

indicate Aldon did not contemplate the actions undertaken by a party
such as Spiegel and thus did not protect itself by obtaining a valid
copyright. Because the suit involved a third-party wrongdoer (Spiegel)

who conceded infringement but attempted to escape liability by arguing the work was not made for hire and that Aldon did not own
the copyright, the court fashioned the actual control test. 5 9

157. Aldon Accessories Ltd. v. Spiegel, Inc., 738 F.2d 548, 549-50 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 469 U.S. 982 (1984). See also supra text accompanying notes 79-84.
158. The 1976 Act states:
(d) Transfer of Ownership.
(1) The ownership of a copyright may be transferred in whole or in part
by any means of conveyance or by operation of law, and may be bequeathed
by will or pass as personal property by the applicable laws of intestate
succession.
(2) Any of the exclusive rights comprised in a copyright, including any
subdivision of any of the rights specified by section 106, may be transferred
as provided by clause (1) and owned separately. The owner of any particular
exclusive right is entitled, to the extent of that right, to all of the protection
and remedies accorded to the copyright owner by this title.
17 U.S.C. § 201(d) (1982).
159. This test was viewed by the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals as a narrow
"exception" to the general rule that independent contractors hold the copyright in
their work. See Easter Seal Society for Crippled Children and Adults of La., Inc. v.
Playboy Enters., 815 F.2d 323, 333 (5th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 981 (1988).
The Fifth Circuit recognized that the court in Aldon may have been driven to create
the exception because a third party wrongdoer and not the independent contractor
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In the alternative, the court could have decided Aldon on the
basis of co-authorship 6° as was done in Mister B Textiles, Inc. v.
Woodcrest Fabrics, Inc.' 61 The plaintiff hired a freelance designer to
help create a new fabric design. The defendant was sued for infringing
the design and argued the plaintiff did not own the copyright because
the design was created by an independent contractor. Rather than
base its decision strictly on the work for hire doctrine, the court
found one of the plaintiff's employees had closely supervised the
creation of the new design and was a co-author of the fabric design.
Therefore, the plaintiff was a co-author under the work for hire
doctrine.
To the extent the principal of Aldon Accessories conceived the
idea for the statuettes, provided the independent contractor with
would benefit from a literal application of the work for hire provision. Id.
Evans Newton, Inc. v. Chicago Systems Software, 793 F.2d 889 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 479 U.S. 949 (1986), was decided on the basis of the Aldon decision, and
demonstrates the confusion that can result from the creation and proliferation of a
test that is not necessarily applicable to its claimed purpose. Chicago Systems Software
(CSS) was commissioned by Evans Newton, Inc., (ENI) to do the computer programming for a program to be used by educational institutions. Id. at 891. ENI prepared
and CSS signed a document entitled "ENI Microcomputer Program Copyright
Statement" which did not use work for hire terminology but unequivocally specified
the intent of the parties by stating that any programming done by CSS for ENI
would be the exclusive property of ENI. Id. at 892 n.3. Shortly after the program
became operational CSS began to market a substantially similar program, and ENI
brought suit for copyright infringement. Id. at 892. The court held ENI owned the
sole copyright in the work, according to the Aldon actual control analysis, because
CSS was an employee of ENI due to the supervision and direction an ENI employee
exhibited over CSS's work. Id. at 894.
Analysis according to the literal interpretation indicates CSS was an independent
contractor: CSS worked at its own facilities, did not perform services exclusively for
ENI, and was not treated for tax purposes as an employee of ENI. As an independent
contractor, CSS would retain copyright in its work unless the work fit one of the
nine categories and was designated as work for hire in the agreement.
However, the work for hire issue need not have been reached in this case because
the contractual provisions between the parties clearly specified the outcome of the
case. CSS signed an agreement designating ENI as the exclusive owner of any
programs prepared for it by CSS without any contemplation of the work for hire
doctrine. Therefore, ENI's copyright was valid. The court's application of the actual
control test merely clouded the issue.
160. See Easter Seal Society, 815 F.2d at 333; Commissioned Works, supra note
13, at 1302. It has been speculated that the court in Aldon did not decide the case
on joint authorship grounds due to uncertainty that the record would support such
a finding. Commissioned Works, supra note 13, at 1302 n.114.
161. 523 F. Supp. 21, 24-25 (S.D.N.Y. 1981). See definition of co-authorship,
supra note 114.
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sketches, and was involved in the actual manipulation of models until
the statuettes were developed to the last detail, Aldon qualifies as a
co-author of the statuettes. Aldon was therefore entitled to file for
copyright and assert the claim of infringement against a third party.
Therefore, formulation of the actual control test was unnecessary.
The literal interpretation applied to the cases which adopted or
established alternative tests reveals that it was unnecessary for courts
to establish their different interpretations of the 1976 Act. The
alternative tests disrupted uniform application of copyright law and
disregarded the legislative intent to reform, not merely refine, copyright law. The now-clarified interpretation of the 1976 Act discards
the presumption favoring employee-employer relationships and provides predictability so that parties may better determine what interests
they are relinquishing as well as those they should seek to protect
when involved in contract negotiations. The 1976 Act also promotes
the goal of uniformity in copyright law by providing a standard to
apply when parties fail to contract ahead of time to determine their
rights.
C. PRACTICAL IMPACT

While the clarified 1976 Act provides traditional artists guidance
in the legal implications of the employment relationships they enter,
parties involved in areas of the law that are currently developing are
confronted with uncertainty and ambiguity as to what law will apply
to their particular legal controversies. For example, the law applicable
62
to software is in its developmental stage, and software developers
are now confronted with the extent to which the work for hire doctrine
63
will be applied to their form of art.
Software was not always recognized as copyrightable subject
matter, but the Software Copyright Act of 1980 implicitly recognizes
162. In the context of this note, "software developer" refers to the employer in
the case of employee work and the individual artist in the case of an independent
contractor's work.
163. See Hazen, Contract Principles as a Guide for Protecting Intellectual
Property Rights in Computer Software: The Limits of Copyright Protection, The

Evolving Concept of Derivative Works, and the ProperLimits of Licensing Arrangements, 20 U.C. DAvis L. REV. 105, 106 (1986) (the scope of intellectual property
law, especially copyright, is being seriously tested by computer technology); Rines,
Bradford, Burke, Nelligan, Parks, Patashnick & Rose, Computer Software: A New
Proposal for Intellectual Property Protection, 29 IDEA 3, 5 (1988-89) [hereinafter
Computer Software] ("Courts [are] wrestling with the problems of stretching the
Copyright Act to include software 'ideas."').
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the copyrightability of software by including a definition of the term
"computer program."' 14 Other forms of intellectual property protection can be much more effective than copyright, but they also pose
various problems for the party seeking protection.

165

Thus, copyright

has become the chosen method of protection for software in this new

area of the law, 166 and therefore, the work for hire doctrine should
be equally applicable to software developers as it is to other artists
and hiring parties seeking copyright protection for their work.
Software developers, like other artists or hiring parties, need to

understand the legal implications of the kinds of employment relationships they enter so they may protect their interests.167 In addition,

164. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1982) ("A 'computer program' is a set of statements or
instructions to be used directly or indirectly in a computer in order to bring about a
certain result."). Different views exist over the propriety and usefulness of copyright
protection for computer software. See, e.g., Computer Software, supra note 163;
Petraske, Non-ProtectibleElements of Software: The Idea/Expression Distinction Is
Not Enough, 29 IDEA 35 (1988-89); Comment, Work For Hire Dilemma, supra note
3, at 1253; Hazen, supra note 163; Comment, The Incompatibility of Copyright and
Computer Software: An Economic Evaluation And A ProposalFor A Marketplace
Solution, 66 N.C.L. REv. 977 (1988). Different views as to the propriety and
usefulness of patent protection for computer software also exist. See, e.g., Syrowik,
Patent Protectionfor Software Technology-A Powerful New Form of Protection,
67 MIcH. B.J. 968 (1988); Kluth and Lundberg, Design Patents: A New Form of
Intellectual Property Protectionfor Computer Software, 70 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK
OFF. Soc'y 847 (1988). The difference in opinion is primarily due to the "idea/
expression dichotomy." See supra note 10 and accompanying text. Copyright protection extends only to the expression of ideas rather than to the ideas themselves so
that ideas remain available for the public benefit. However, this principle runs afoul
in the computer software context because the value in a software program typically
lies in the idea rather than the expression of the idea.
The general copyrightability of software is beyond the scope of this note.
However, for discussion of this topic, see generally, Ladd & Joseph, Expanding
Computer Software Protection By Limiting The Idea, 2 J.L. & TECH. 5 (1987);
Lamoree, Expanding Copyrights In Software: The Struggle to Define "Expression"
Begins, 4 COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 49 (1988); Karam, Countervailing Considerations, 2 J.L. & TECH. 25 (1987).
165. Computer Software, supra note 163, at 4. A trademark will only protect
against competitors who market the product under the same or a similar label. Trade
secret protection will be lost when a determined competitor destroys the trade secret
by breaking the code. Shrink-wrap licenses are potentially effective but are primarily
untested in the courts. At least one state, Louisiana, has invalidated a shrink-wrap
license. Vault Corp. v. Quaid Software Ltd., 655 F. Supp. 750, 763 (E.D. La. 1987),
aff'd, 847 F.2d 255 (5th Cir. 1988). Finally, patent protection is very effective but
very costly to obtain and litigate. Computer Software, supra note 163, at 4.
166. See Computer Software, supra note 163, at 4.
167. See Comment, Work For Hire Dilemma, supra note 3, at 1253; see also
Hazen, supra note 163, at 106-07.
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software developers are similar to other artists in that some are
employees and some perform their work independently. All put forth
a creative effort to produce useful forms of art from which the public
can benefit. Finally, just like other artists, software developers need
to be given some form of protection for their work as an incentive to
68
continue in that line of work. ,
The Supreme Court's decision in Reid provides predictability to
those persons relying on the work for hire provisions. The work for
hire analysis should apply to software developers because they are
similarly situated to other artists and hiring parties. However, the
impact of the Supreme Court's decision on software developers may
not be felt because, despite being increasingly addressed, courts
dealing with software controversies have rarely relied upon the work
1 69
for hire doctrine as a basis for decision.
The results of cases that construed the work for hire doctrine
provide support for the view that detailed contracts specifying copyright entitlement should be used to apportion rights rather than
subsequent reliance on court application of law which is in the process
of developing. 70 The need for such contractual agreement is illustrated
by BPI Systems, Inc. v. Leith 7' and Specialized Computer Systems
72
v. Good Rush Messenger Service. 1
In BPI Systems, Inc. v. Leith,' 73 an independent programmer,
Leith, was hired to create twelve programs. BPI submitted confidential
documents and routines to Leith to use in creating the programs.
Leith subsequently created a computer system similar to that which
he created for BPI using the confidential information that had been
provided to him. BPI sought to enjoin Leith from selling the system.
The court held that Leith retained copyright in the work because he
168. See supra text accompanying note 13.
169. See, e.g., S.O.S., Inc. v. Payday, Inc., 886 F.2d 1081, 1087 (9th Cir. 1989)
(court found it unnecessary to address question whether former employees who
continued to work on projects after formal employment ceased remained "employees"
for the purposes of the work for hire doctrine, holding that the "interim work was
most likely not work for hire . . . ."); Softel, Inc. v. Dragon Medical and Scientific
Comm'n, Inc., No. 87 Civ. 0167 (1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6928) (company is within
its rights to employ independent contractors on a work for hire basis); Q-Co.
Industries, Inc. v. Hoffman, 625 F. Supp. 608 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (employer's motions
for preliminary and injuctive relief were denied because infringement was not
established).
170. See Hazen, supra note 163, at 157.
171. 532 F. Supp. 208 (W.D. Tex. 1981).
172. No. 84 Civ. 9327 (1987 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2995).
173. 532 F. Supp. 208 (W.D. Tex. 1981).
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was not an employee acting within the scope of employment, the
work was specially commissioned, and there was no written agreement
providing the work was "for hire." 1 74 Had BPI obtained a contractual
clause specifying the ways in which Leith could use the confidential
information, BPI would not have had to rely upon the court's
application of the work for hire doctrine.
In Specialized Computer Systems v. Good Rush Messenger Service, ' the court found the programmer's work was not "for hire"
based on the Aldon Accessories actual control test. 76 As a result, the
programmer retained copyright in his work. Because the programmer
refused to continue working to make the program operational, the
messenger service that had commissioned his services was left with an
unfinished, and therefore unusable, program. In addition, because
the copyright rested with the programmer, the messenger service was
unable to obtain the source code which would enable the messenger
service to employ another programmer to make the program operational. A contractual provision specifying the parties' duties and rights
may have entitled the messenger service to specific performance and
would have eliminated the need to rely on the work for hire doctrine.
These cases reveal that the courts do not appear to include
software as falling within any of the nine categories of commissioned
works that are eligible to be work for hire. Thus, an employeremployee relationship must exist for the hiring party to obtain the
copyright in the software based upon the work for hire doctrine.
However, as demonstrated in BPI Systems 77 and Specialized Computer Systems, 78 contracting ahead of time may be the best plan to
follow, at least for the hiring party.
V.

CONCLUSION

The 1976 Act provides two exclusive means for work to be
considered "work for hire": one for employees and one for independent contractors. However, the 1976 Act did not specify how to

analyze whether a person is an employee or independent contractor,
and four tests emerged: (1) the right to control test; (2) the formal,
salaried employee test; (3) the actual control test; and (4) the literal
174. BPI Systems, Inc. v. Leith, 532 F. Supp. 208, 210 (W.D. Tex. 1981).
175. No. 84 Civ. 9327 (1987 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2995).
176. Id. See discussion of the Aldon Accessories decison supra text accompanying
notes 79-84.
177. 532 F. Supp. 208 (W.D. Tex. 1981).
178. No. 84 Civ. 9327 (1987 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2995).
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interpretation. The Supreme Court resolved the discrepancy in Reid,
holding the literal interpretation to be the proper test to use for
determining employee or independent contractor status. Thus, the
employee clause favors employers with the copyright, and the independent contractor clause favors independent contractors by limiting
the categories of commissioned works that can be work for hire and
by requiring a written agreement designating the work "for hire."
The literal interpretation accords with the apparent intent of Congress
evidenced in the legislative history, because the work for hire provisions of the 1976 Act were arrived at through delicately balancing the
rights of artists and employers or commissioning parties.
The Supreme Court's resolution of the discrepancy provides
predictability and uniformity to the work for hire doctrine so that
artists and hiring parties can understand what rights they are relinquishing and what interests to protect when involved in contract
negotiations. Software developers, being no different from other
artists and hiring parties, should be afforded protection by the work
for hire doctrine, although the doctrine has not yet been readily
applied to software cases. The few cases in which the work for hire
doctrine was applied indicate that the best approach is to determine
parties' rights by contract prior to commencement of the work.
SHEILA HEITKE

